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Since the inception of the European Community/Union, the European 
Commission has been the engine of European integration, but studies have failed 
to account for how office holders in the Commission conceive authority in the 
European Union. I explain variation in supranationalist and intergovemmentalist 
views among top Commission officials, using 140 interviews and 106 mail 
questionnaires undertaken between July 1995 and May 1997. Officials’ views 
are greatly influenced by prior career and previous political socialization, with 
former state employees and nationals of large, unitary states leaning to 
intergovemmentalism and those without former state experience and from 
federal systems to supranationalism. Partial confirmation of a principal-agent 
logic is found in that officials in powerful Commission services favor 
supranationalism, but only if prior socialization predisposes them to such views. 






















































































































































































This study examines the views on European integration of a strategic subset of 
Europe’s political elite, the senior career officials of the European Commission1. 
Since the inception of the European Union, then Community, the European 
Commission has been the engine of European integration'. Yet, we know very 
little about how the people who hold positions in this institution conceive of 
authority in the European Union. Should political authority be vested in the 
member states and the Council of Ministers, or should supranational institutions 
like the European Commission and the European Parliament be strengthened? 
To the extent that the question has been posed, scholars have usually assumed 
that the Commission is a unitary actor, that the office holders within this 
organization defend the institutional interest of the Commission as a whole. This 
simplifying assumption certainly helps to develop parsimonious explanations. 
However, our understanding of European integration remains poor at best, and 
possibly mistaken, if we fail to account for the motivations and opinions of key 
position holders in the European institutions. This paper seeks to explain 
variation in orientations about European integration among Commission players. 
In the language of European integration scholars, what makes some Commission 
officials advocate intergovemmentalist views while others support supranational 
governance?
Most studies on the Commission to date have concentrated on the College 
of Commissioners (Landfried 1996; MacMullen 1997; Page, Wouters 1994; 
Schneider 1997). These twenty high-profile politicians are appointed for five 
years by member state governments and the European Parliament to give 
direction to the executive-administrative engine of the European Union. This 
study focuses instead on the 200 career civil servants of A1 and A2 grade who 
occupy positions as director-generals, directors and senior advisors. They give 
leadership to about 4,000 Commission administrators, report to the College, and 
direct negotiations with the other institutional players.
There are good reasons to explore the political orientations of 
Commission officials. These officials, in conjunction with the College, have a 
constitutional obligation to play a prominent political role in the EU. In contrast to 
their national counterparts, they have the unique competence to initiate and draft 
legislation, they have the formal responsibility to be the engine of integration 
(article 155, EC), and they have extensive powers of execution, implementation 
and -  in some policy areas -  control and adjudication. Of course, the role played 
by senior civil servants is usually a hybrid of bureaucratic routine and politics 
(Aberbach, Rockman, Putnam 1981; Page 1985). But, for top administrators in the 
Commission, the balance is heavily tilted towards politics. As a recent recruit 
and former national politician remarked: “Here, everyone is taking part in 
[politics], so it is difficult to see where politics ends and where administration 



























































































public administration. Then I found that there is as much politics here as in the 
[national] cabinet.” (Senior official, 014). Nearly all senior officials would risk a 
battle to get things done, 67 per cent are prepared to bend rules to achieve 
results, and 58 per cent believe that officials should express their ideological 
convictions even at the risk of conflict with colleagues3. Senior Commission 
officials interpret, live and help reshape the political architecture of the 
European Union day by day. What image of Europe do they promote, how do 
their views differ, and why do they hold such divergent views? My aim is to 
address these questions, using information from extensive interviews with 140 
senior Commission officials and 106 mail questionnaires undertaken by myself 
between July 1995 and May 1997.
In the next section, I describe how a siipranationalist and an 
intergovemmentalist official typically conceive of authority in the European 
Union4. The following sections hypothesize about the sources of variation in 
Commission officials’ views, develop indicators and test the hypotheses against 
the data.
SUPRANATIONALISTS AND INTERGOVERNMENTALISTS
Virtually all senior Commission officials rule out a Europe of sovereign nation­
states (Hooghe 1997). This response is typical: ‘The problem is to find an 
efficient institutional construct — I am not only thinking of economic efficiency, 
but also of political efficacy. We know very well that, politically, we need to go 
beyond the nation-state.” (Senior official, 027.) They wish to create a common 
structure for authoritative decision making in Europe. But they disagree on the 
desirable balance between intergovernmental and supranational principles. So 
how does the Europe of a Supranationalist differ from that of an 
Intergovemmentalist?
Europe as goal or instrument. For a Supranationalist, the dominant issue 
in European Union politics is about the future of European integration. “I am not 
in the business of right-wing or left-wing policies. ...Whether we promote 
European integration, ... that is what counts.... [Ideology] is the wrong axis. We 
are most divided on another axis: pro-integration or anti-integration.” (Official’s 
emphasis, senior official, 058). An Intergovemmentalist does not share this zest 
to build Europe: “For me, it is something realistic, concrete, and inevitable.” 
(Senior official, 120).
Democratic or technocratic. For Supranationalists, building Europe 




























































































will not bring about an integrated Europe; politicization and increased 
participation will. “You need a technocratic plan and a democratic plan. We 
have the technocratic plan, which is [centered on] the Commission. And we 
have now democratic progress, with increased powers for the Parliament — not 
enough, but it is getting better. ...We have made tremendous progress, but we 
need real democratic control.” (Senior official, 058) The Commission should 
encourage Europeans to become citizens: I believe that is our task; to make
of subjects active members of the European Union.... My role is to introduce the 
citizen in Europe.” (Official’s emphasis, senior official, 070) Not so an 
Intergovemmentalist, for whom the European Commission should be an 
instrument to help produce better policies, and the political objectives should be 
set elsewhere. “I am an official servant of the European construction. I have 
tried to make Europe as relevant as I could in the various policy areas I have 
been responsible for. But I am convinced that this construction must remain very 
attentive to national sensitivities ... We know very well that the national states 
must retain a very important place in the [European] construction.” (Senior 
official, 027)
Activism or Mediation. A Supranationalist usually loves a good 
institutional fight, in which he comes down on the side of the Commission. “... I 
love everything having to do with defending the prerogatives of the Commission 
vis-à-vis Council and Parliament.” (Senior official, 070). Intergovemmentalists 
find this institutional bickering a waste of time and energy: “I am interested in 
better policies ... this is important. The part played by the Commission: minor 
problem.... Fighting for the Commission’s prerogatives is counterproductive and 
ridiculous.” (Senior official, 120)
Intergovemmentalists are policy makers, not politicians, with a realist(ic) 
view of Europe. Europe is there, and it is useful to the extent that it achieves 
better solutions to common problems. It is essentially made; it has happened. 
“We are within the European Union with various partners: the Council, the 
Commission, the Parliament.... And what really counts is that we have a 
successful policy.” (Senior official, 120) Supranationalists are political animals 
with a radical view of Europe. For them, Europe is in the making: “We are 
building Europe, we are building a new society, we are building a better 
continent.” (Official’s emphasis, senior official, 058) For both, the bottom line is 






























































































I conceptualize the political beliefs of senior Commission officials on European 
integration along two theoretical tracks. On the one hand, individuals are 
socialized in particular institutional environments, and I draw insights from a 
rich literature on socialization and institutional learning to specify which 
experiences influence Commission officials. On the other hand, individuals 
often seek to shape institutions consciously and purposively, and I use a 
principal-agent reasoning to explore this political logic.
The socialization logic emphasizes institutional learning as a mechanism 
which shapes political orientations (Rohrschneider 1994, 1996). This reasoning 
builds upon the notion that people are social beings who are influenced by the 
experiences and views they encounter in different walks of life. Institutions help 
shape individuals’ orientations, and the challenge is to identify which settings 
and under what circumstances. Many socialization studies have emphasized the 
importance of childhood or young adult experiences for the formation of belief 
systems. That may be even more so for elites than for ordinary citizens. Most 
elite members grow up in highly educated, politically conscious families, where 
they are likely to pick up views around the dinner table (Putnam 1976). But 
other studies claim that the views of an elite member are much more influenced 
by his current roles and affiliations than by prior experiences (Putnam 1976; 
Searing 1969, 1994; Suleiman 1974). There is also much debate about whether 
social sources, such as education, social background, work experiences, or 
political institutions, such as like regime characteristics, political culture, 
individual political activity are likely to be sources of learning. Although there is 
no general theory of socialization explaining how institutional settings shape 
elite views about politics and society, the arguments elaborated by socialization 
theorists provide a useful guide.
A second line of theorizing entails a political logic. Beliefs about political 
life are not only inculcated through learning and socialization. Actors also come 
to hold views in the context of purposeful political action. Fundamental political 
orientations are constantly put to the test by political struggle among a variety of 
political actors. This happens also in the context of European integration. When 
Commission officials take positions on the supranational-intergovernmental 
continuum, they make a political statement having to do with the degree of 
autonomy they want vis-à-vis national governments. As an ardent 





























































































One would expect Commission officials to defend their institution against 
national governments seeking to control the Commission. A useful angle to 
hypothesize about this political logic is provided by the principal-agent model 
(Bawn 1995; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987; Ringquist 1995). In the 
European Union, national governments may be conceived of as the principals 
who want the Commission to be their agent, that is, to perform functions 
according to the preferences of national governments (Pollack 1997). However, 
without political control from the principal, the agent will pursue his own 
agenda (Bawn 1995). Such control is never perfect, and current principal-agent 
literature concentrates on how control instruments can constrain agency 
discretion (Bawn 1995; Ringquist 1995; Wood and Waterman 1993). Applied to 
the EU, the starting point is that, without political controls, European 
Commission officials should be supranationalist, because supranational 
governance gives them maximum discretion over policy making. If Commission 
officials deviate from their base position, one may expect this to be the result of 
control by national governments.
HYPOTHESES
These two lines of theorizing lead to a number of hypotheses. First, I argue that 
Commission officials may be influenced by experiences in three distinct, but 
complementary walks of life: prior experience of living abroad, socialization in 
the workplace, and learning in the political system of their country of origin. 
Second, I argue that national governments are in a position to influence whether 
supranationalist or intergovemmentalist officials occupy top positions in the 
Commission, mainly through their role in determining decision rules and their 
input in recruitment.
Transnational socialization
\The multi-linguistic, cosmopolitan, and somewhat insular environment of the 
Commission places high demands on individuals. Most people are 
extraordinarily adept at mustering resources from a heterogeneous and fluid 
environment. I hypothesize that Commission officials with previous 
transnational experience feel more comfortable playing a more independent and 
political role in a multinational Commission than those without prior experience 
outside national institutions. International education is a critical element of 
transnational experience. Students abroad are exposed to different ways of 
thinking and living in a formative period of their life -  young adulthood. What is 
more, they come to realize that expatriates have limited citizenship rights 
compared to nationals at home and encounter barriers to participation in the host 





























































































out of place. So the transnational socialization hypothesis predicts that 
Commission officials who studied abroad are more likely to be supranationalist 
than those who were educated in their home country.
Career socialization
Experiences in the workplace influence belief systems. That is all the more 
likely for senior Commission officials, who are career-oriented. Many clock 
twelve-hour days. Recent work on elites argues that career analysis is a powerful 
venue to assess which institutions shape individuals’ motivations (Ross 
Schneider 1993; Searing 1994). Which features of their career may lead 
Commission officials to be more or less supranationalist?
Commission career socialization. A first hypothesis is that the longer 
officials have been in the Commission, the more they have internalized the 
institutional self-interest of the Commission. This refines an assumption 
underlying many studies of the European Union, that the institutional self- 
interest of the Commission is to pursue a federal Europe and expand European 
competencies, and that Commission officials can be expected to live by Myles’ 
law of “you stand where you sit”. A socialization argument adds time to the 
equation: it takes time for institutions to shape orientations, and officials leam 
over time to “stand where they sit” (Rohrschneider 1994; Ross Schneider 1993; 
Searing 1994).
• Pre-EU career socialization. Few Commission officials join the 
Commission straight from university. On average, they previously worked 
eleven years in a variety of other settings. I hypothesize that former state 
administrators are most likely to be in favor of a governance stmcture with a 
predominant role for national governments. They have often retained career 
prospects in their home administration, have been trained to develop a sense of 
“national public service” in more (French, British) or less (Italian) structured 
settings, are socialized into national administrative styles, and are keyed into 
national networks. Hence, officials without prior professional ties to state 
institutions (universities, non-governmental organizations, international 
organizations, business, or in European institutions) should be more 
supranationalist.
Political socialization
“What an individual believes about the political process is learned from 
observation of that process”(Verba 1963). The political system — particularly 
that of the formative years — helps shape how an individual thinks about 




























































































gradually take on new values (Rohrschneider 1994, 1996). In Europe, 
democratic politics is still mainly national politics. One must, therefore, examine 
the national political systems in which Commission officials learned to 
participate as citizens.
I hypothesize that the size of political units is crucial for orientations 
towards European integration, for two reasons. First, smaller units have greater 
need for supranational governance to control an uncertain external environment. 
Second, they have less to lose than larger units when they give up national 
sovereignty, because -  even without a formal transfer of sovereignty -  their 
policy choices are severely constrained. So for political units that are most 
sensitive to interdependence, a supranational authority should make mles more 
efficiently and impartially than an intergovernmental authority dependent on the 
consent of interested governments. Variations of this functional argument 
dominated the early European integration studies, most prominently in the 
functionalist theory of David Mitrany, and with important qualifications in Karl 
Deutsch’ transactional approach and neofunctionalist models (Haas 1958; 
Schmitter 1969). The theory has recently been elaborated by Alec Stone and 
Wayne Sandholtz (1996; Stone and Caporaso 1997). I hypothesize that officials 
from small countries and federal systems are more supranationalist than those 
from less interdependence-sensitive political systems.
Small countries. National boundaries constrain life most patently in small 
countries. To produce wealth, quality of life and stability, they need many 
resources from outside their national boundaries. Sovereignty has limited value 
for citizens of small countries. As Peter Katzenstein has shown, the elites of 
Europe’s smaller democracies have learned that it is better to adjust their 
societies to the external environment than to shield them from the outside; in 
contrast, larger states search more readily for national solutions (Katzenstein 
1985). Elites in small societies want to domesticate external influences, that is, 
make resources outside their boundaries readily accessible for their population. 
European supranational governance promises to domesticate a wide range of 
resources long-term. I hypothesize therefore that senior Commission officials 
from small member states are more likely to favor supranationalism.
Federal systems. Small countries need rule making at supranational level; 
federal countries are used to rule making at multiple levels. Federalism 
structures relations among a number of smaller, relatively autonomous and open 
political systems. It does for subnational political units what EU governance — 
on a larger scale, and in a looser arrangement — does for small and open national 
states. From a federal perspective, EU governance merely adds another 
protective layer of structuring, which pushes back the uncertain external 




























































































integration extends multi-level governance beyond national boundaries. I 
hypothesize that officials from federal and semi-federal political systems are 
more likely to favor supranationalism to bring European institutional 
arrangements in line with national experiences; people from unitary states 
should feel more comfortable with intergovemmentalist positions.
The central tenet of these hypotheses is that learning is a key mechanism 
through which political orientations are shaped. However, whether European 
governance should be supranationalist or intergovemmentalist is also contested 
among political actors. Commission officials are an interested party in an intense 
struggle for control over EU authoritative resources. One might expect them to 
defend the power of the Commission, unless national governments find ways to 
control them. I use insights from current principal-agent literature to hypothesize 
about how national governments may constrain the agent’s views.
Control over procedures
\Bureaucratic insulation or vulnerability to principal control is a function of rules. 
Students of American politics claim that Congress uses its power to regulate 
principal-agency relations strategically. From this perspective, agent preferences 
are endogenous, a function of procedural choices made by Congress. Others 
state that Congress is far less strategic or cannot foresee how particular rules 
affect agents (for a discussion, see Bawn 1995). The extent to which national 
governments are able to regulate Commission discretion and check unintended 
consequences is debated in EU studies (Marks, Hooghe, Blank 1996; Moravcsik 
1993; Pierson 1996).
V
Procedural controls vary considerably across policy areas, and this creates 
different opportunity structures for Commission officials. Officials in areas of 
strong EU competencies are less dependent on national governments’ consent to 
get things done than officials in areas of mainly national competencies. In fact, 
the former are often expected to challenge national interests. So I hypothesize 
that Commission officials will be more supranationalist to the extent that 
national governments have less control over decision making.
Control over recruitment
It is very difficult to alter the values of bureaucrats. It is much easier to get the 
right people in place and to keep them there, but this requires the power to hire 
and fire (Ringquist 1995). In American politics, the spoils system combined 
with mandatory approval by the Senate of top federal administrators provides 
the key principal — the Senate — with significant leverage over appointments in 




























































































have such formal control powers. Top officials are selected by the College of 
Commissioners, which is appointed every five years by the European Council 
and the European Parliament. Nevertheless, indirect control may give national 
governments leverage over bureaucratic recruitment. The question is which 
orientations these national principals want to promote.
Parachutase. A simple version of this principal-agent argument is 
suggested by the state-centric model, which argues that national governments’ 
overriding preference is to maximize the benefits of European cooperation while 
minimizing sovereignty loss (Hoffmann 1982; Moravscik 1991, 1993). National 
governments should therefore be keen to recruit intergovemmentalist 
candidates. That is particularly so for officials parachuted into A1 or A2 
positions from outside the Commission administration. Nearly half of the top 
officials are recruited through parachutage; the other half are career Commission 
officials promoted from in-house middle-management. I expect parachuted top 
Commission officials to be more intergovemmentalist than career officials.
Consociational control. State-centric models claim that national
governments — by virtue of their institutional position — want to maintain 
maximum control over EU policy making, which is best guaranteed under 
intergovernmental decision rules. Yet, a recent elite survey shows that national 
elites from the fifteen member states hold divergent views on the desirable 
balance between supranational and intergovernmental principles of governance 
(Eurobarometer, 1996). The Commission has multiple principals with divergent 
preferences. In theory, multiple principals should make it easier for an agent to 
shirk principals’ preferences (Wood and Waterman 1993). But what happens if 
each principal has control over its faction in the agency? For the European 
Union, this argument is made most cogently by Paul Taylor, who characterizes 
the EU as a consociational regime in which EU policy areas and Commission 
personnel are divided among member states (Taylor 1991). Taylor finds support 
for his argument in Commission personnel policy, which assures a balance 
between nationalities for top positions so that national proportions roughly 
reflect the distribution of votes in the Council of Ministers. If Taylor’s argument 
holds, variation in the orientations of senior Commission officials to EU 





























































































Orientations to EU governance
Should political authority be vested predominantly in the member states and the 
Council, or primarily in supranational institutions like the European 
Commission and/ or the European Parliament? I compose an index variable 
Supranationalism of three items, which refer to complementary aspects of 
political authority relations in the European Union5. Item one asks whether 
ultimate authority should rest with the components (member states) or with the 
whole (Europe). However, even if one is in favor of greater authority at 
European level, the question arises whether such authority should be 
concentrated in a non-elected technocratic body (Commission) or, in analogy 
with national political systems, shared with directly elected representatives 
(European Parliament). Item two and three tap these choices (Table I)6.
Table I : Orientations towards European Integration (%)









1. The member states, not the Commission nor the 
European Parliament, ought to remain the 
central pillars of the European Union
7.5 24.5 4.7 34.9 28.3 2.14
2. It is imperative that the European Commission 
become the true government of the European 
Union.
13.2 35.8 3.8 24.5 22.6 2.42
3. The Commission should support the European 
Parliament’s bid for full legislative powers, 
even if the price would be to lose its monopoly 
of initiative.
7.5 28.3 3.8 32.1 28.3 2.17
* Values range between 1 (No) to 4 (Yes); neutral = 2.5.
** A high value on item 1 suggests intergovemmentalism, while high values on item 2 and 3 
indicate supranationalism.
Transnational socialization: I use a dummy variable for Transnational 
Education, where Commission officials who studied abroad are assigned a value 





























































































Prior Career Socialization: My measure for Prior Career is the sum of (a) 
years spent in the national state sector, and (b) years serving their national 
government in EU affairs. Values range from zero to 30 years, with an average 
between seven and eight, and a median of four years. A high value means that a 
person spent most of his career in the state sector7. A low value indicates one of 
two possibilities: either that person worked outside the state sector before 
coming to the Commission, or he joined the Commission at the start of his 
career.
Commission Socialization: I use Length o f Service, that is, the number of years 
served in the Commission until the interview. A top official has spent on 
average 18 years in the Commission, ranging from a few months to 37 years.
Country Size: I use Population Size o f the Country o f Origin of each senior 
Commission official. Values are expressed in millions.
Federalism: Political Structure o f Country o f Origin is a composite index of 
three variables, which take into account formal constitutional provisions as well 
as informal practices. Values range from 0 (no federal experience) to 8 (full- 
fledged federalism). I calculate scores for each country, which I then allocate to 
Commission officials by nationality. The scoring refers to the situation at the 
time of the interview (1995-97)8.
Procedural Control: I combine formal and reputational measures of 
Commission autonomy. For formal attributes of autonomy, I use figures 
compiled by Edward Page (1997, p. 105) on three authoritative outputs from the 
Commission: regulations, directives and decisions that require Council approval; 
regulations, directives and decisions that do not require Council approval; 
initiation of European Court of Justice cases by the Commission. The latter two 
indicate the extent to which the Commission has discretion to make rules or 
make others comply with EU rules9. In addition, I use a reputational question 
posed to 140 top officials in the Commission between 1995 and 1997, in which 
they name the three or four most powerful DG’s or services in the Commission 
at the time of the interview10. Capturing Commission autonomy vis-à-vis its 
principal, the Council, in a single indicator is a tall order, but this composite 
index should do a better job than most standard indicators. I calculate scores for 
each Directorate-General (DG).
Parachutage: A dummy variable has a value equal to one if an official was 
appointed from outside into a top position (parachutage), and a value of zero if 




























































































Consociational Control: To measure the preferences of each national principal. 
I use data from an elite survey, conducted by Eurobarometer in 1996. I calculate 
relative national support for the European Union on the basis of three items 
involving the inter-institutional balance between member states and European 
institutions, and between Council and the European Parliament. 1 use these 
specific rather than the more general items about affective and instrumental EU 
support, which are often employed in EU opinion analysis. The reason is that the 
three institutional items take us further in measuring supranationalist versus 
intergovemmentalist orientations". I calculate national elite’s orientations by 
averaging support percentages for the three items and then normalizing scores. 





























































































































































































































































































































































Adj R2 .021 .075 .028 .100 .000 .022 .080 .000
Note: Entries are standardized regression coefficients (Beta) (OLS); Standard Error o f Means in parentheses 
*** p<=.01 ** p<=.05 *p<=.10
Table IV : Multivariate Linear Regression Results
Model 1 2 3 4 5
Transnational
education
.088 .082 .114 .102 .107








.208** .232 ** -.267*** -.271** -.198
Procedural
discretion





.146 .163 .142 .259***
Parachutage .146
R2 .286 .275 .243 .238 .257
Adj R2 .226 .230 .197 .199 .219
Note: Entries are standardized regression coefficients (Beta) (OLS). Pairwise deletion of missing values 





























































































The transnational socialization hypothesis predicts that officials with greater 
transnational experience are likely to be more supranationalist. This hypothesis 
finds some support in the univariate analysis (Table III), but the effect is rather 
weak (significant at level .1). When one controls for other, far more powerful 
factors, this variable drops out. The reason for this is that study abroad varies 
decisively by nationality, and this effect is picked up by the three country-level 
variables.
-^Career Socialization
Work experiences strongly influence the orientations of senior Commission 
officials. Measures for prior career (years of state service) and for length of 
service in the Commission are significantly associated with political views 
(Table III). Former national civil servants, diplomats or government ministers 
are most likely to be intergovemmentalist, and all the more so when they spent a 
considerable period “serving their country”. Conversely, working in and for the 
Commission makes individuals more supranationalist. However, state 
institutions appear a more effective socialization context than the Commission: a 
prior stint in the state sector leaves a greater imprint on an official’s orientations 
than his current experience in the service.
Both effects are strongly significant in the univariate analysis. However, 
Commission socialization does not survive my controls (Table IV, Model 1). 
The reason is collinearity: the two variables largely duplicate one another. A 
large proportion of variance in Commission socialization is accounted for by 
prior career. Collinearity may produce unstable regression coefficients, and this 
is apparent in models containing both variables (Model l ) 13.
The main way of dealing with collinearity is to exclude the most affected 
variable, as is shown in the twin Models 2 and 3. If one leaves out length of 
service, prior career socialization immediately jumps to be the foremost 
predictor of officials’ orientations (Model 2). The estimates appear robust across 
models. When I exclude prior career and keep length of service in the equation 
(Model 3), service in the Commission is positively and significantly associated 
(at the .05 level) with supranationalist orientations. Model 2 and 3 suggest 
alternative, equally plausible rationales for understanding how Commission 
officials’ orientations are shaped.
The theoretical implications are far-reaching. Neither advocates of the 
resilience of the state nor those who claim that the national state has been eroded 




























































































hollowed out by subnational and supranational influences; they are still capable 
of inducing individuals within their boundaries to take national interests 
seriously. However, that influence is restricted to their most direct agents: 
former state employees at home. It does not reach to those who represent the 
state abroad, and certainly not to non-state actors. A former civil servant is 
inclined to be intergovemmentalist (r=-.30, p=.002); an ex-diplomat who was 
posted in Brussels is marginally more likely to be intergovemmentalist than 
supranationalist (r=-.09, p=.354); and there is no way of telling whether a former 
business person or university teacher will be intergovemmentalist or 
supranationalist (r=.04, p=.725)14.
Supporters of the erosion thesis overestimate the capacity of the 
Commission to be a greenhouse for supranationalism. While Commission 
officials generally become more supranationalist over time, the effect is 
surprisingly weak. A closer look at the data suggests that the trend is non-linear. 
The relationship is shaped by a cohort effect and the effect of enlargement on 
recruitment. First of all, stronger or weaker supranationalism among 
Commission officials appears to coincide with the arrival of new recruits. 
Cohort effects indicate that Commission officials start their job with pre-formed 
views that reflect the political climate to European integration at the time of 
recruitment. One would need longitudinal data to disentangle the respective 
impact of cohort and Commission socialization, but Table V strongly suggests 
that cohort effects only partly account for the non-linear pattern in Commission 
orientations. I divide 40 years of EU history in six historical periods: 
supranational founding (1958-66), aftermath of de Gaulle crisis (1967-72), first 
enlargement (1973-79), Eurosclerosis (1980-85), Delorsian Euro-optimism 
(1986-1991), and post-Maastricht Euro-malaise (1992-97). Commission recruits 
are out of sync with the political climate for three of the six periods. They are 
supranationalist in the late 1960s, when the Commission was in retreat after 
French president Charles de Gaulle’s rejection of supranationalism. They are 
only marginally supranationalist in the late 1980s-early 1990s at the peak of 
Euro-phoria. They are less intergovemmentalist than expected after 1992, when 





























































































Table V : Supranationalism bv Cohort of Recruitment A fiss ion  Wave
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Note: Values on the supranationalism index range 1-10, with 5.5 as neutral score. Cell 
entries indicate how much a group leans in supranationalist (+) or intergovemmentalist (-) 
direction ; maximum deviation = 4.5. Number o f officials in brackets; standard deviations for 
totals. Figures in bold refer to enlargement recruitments.
EU observers have pointed out that enlargement alters political practices and 
priorities in the European Union (Wallace 1996). There is good reason to 
believe that it also affects the Commission. With enlargement, some senior posts 
in the Commission administration are set aside for recruits from the new 
countries. To fill these posts quickly, the Commission brushes 'aside normal 
recruitment procedures and relies heavily on advice from national capitals. So 
recruits from new member states may reflect more directly the political climate 
in their particular country than recruits from established member states. Member 
states in the first enlargement wave (UK, Ireland, and Denmark) were reluctant 
to embrace supranationalism, and so original Commission recruits from these 
countries should be more intergovemmentalist than concurrent recruits from the 
original six. The second wave of entrants (Greece, Spain, Portugal) were 
enthusiastic about EU membership, so one expects to find supranationalism 




























































































third enlargement (Austria, Finland, and Sweden) took place amidst rising 
public criticism towards European integration, and so one would expect these 
recruits to be more intergovemmentalist. In other words, one should be able to 
link non-linear patterns in Commission orientations to these enlargement shocks. 
Table V provides partial support for this hypothesis. The original contingent 
from Denmark, UK and Ireland is more intergovemmentalist than most recruits 
for that period, and the first recruits from the southern countries are more 
supranationalist than their colleagues. However, officials from the latest three 
members are less intergovemmentalist than expected; they even lean to 
supranationalism. In fact, Austrian, Swedish and Finnish top officials are more 
supranationalist than recent recruits from the first twelve members, and — even 
more surprising -  than all Commission officials recruited since 1973 (except for 
the second enlargement). Furthermore, the enlargement effect disappears for 
subsequent cohorts. While the special enlargement appointments for the UK, 
Denmark and Ireland up till 1978 lean to intergovemmentalism, the British. 
Danish and Irish officials appointed after 1979 are less intergovemmentalist 
than their contemporaries from the original six countries. The general propensity 
to intergovemmentalism over the last fifteen years is driven by officials from the 
original six countries, not by recruits from first, second or third waves of 
enlargement15. So enlargement shocks, together with ebbs and flows in the 
general climate to European integration, go some way in explaining why 
Commission socialization does not follow a smooth linear trend16.
Federalism and Country Size
The political socialization hypothesis conceives the orientations of officials on 
EU governance as the product of what they learned in their domestic political 
environment. I hypothesize that officials from small countries or from federal 
countries, that is the two territorial entities most sensitive to external influences, 
are more likely to be supranationalist than those from large countries or from 
unitary systems. Both hypotheses find strong confirmation in the multivariate 
models.
Whether an official comes from a federal or federalizing country is the 
most powerful predictor of where he stands on European governance (Table III). 
Austrian, Belgian, German and Spanish officials are appreciably more likely to 
support supranationalism than officials from unitary countries like Denmark, 
France, Ireland, the Netherlands or Portugal. This effect remains very strong 
when controlling for other variables. The exceptions are the Italian officials, 
who are more supranationalist than one would expect from citizens of a unitary 
country. However, the Italian national state is relatively weak and authority is 
fragmented over a variety of territorial units -  north-south, regions, towns (Hine 




























































































means to structure an uncertain external environment, Italians want European 
government to substitute for ineffective national government1
Country size becomes significant only in the presence of controls (Table 
III and IV). The main reason is that federalism crowds out the influence of 
country size. Federalism breaks up large countries in smaller pockets of social 
and political life. Only for unitary countries is the effect significant: r = -.36 
(significant at .05 level), against r = -.13 (p = .51) for non-unitary countries and r 
= -.08 (p = .72) for federal countries. The larger the basic unit of political and 
social life in their home country, the more likely that officials are 
intergovemmentalist.
Procedural Control
The procedural control hypothesis explains political orientations in terms of who 
controls decision making in particular policy areas: the Commission or the 
Council of Ministers. It predicts that policy areas with greater decisional 
autonomy (discretion) for the Commission induce officials to be 
supranationalist. Concretely, officials in competition policy, agriculture, external 
trade or regional policy should be more supranationalist than those in education, 
culture or tourism. The statistical analysis supports the thesis “you stand where 
you sit”. Procedural discretion is associated with orientations in the expected 
way (r = .18) but only at .1 level (Table III). However, the parameter gains 
considerable significance with controls (Table IV, Models 1-5).
There are two reasons why the variable becomes only powerful in the 
multivariate analysis. One has to do with imprecise measurements, which 
suppress the fit in the simple regression. The index automatically produces low 
values for more recently established DG’s, because the formal indicators use 
data covering a 15-year period. Though the reputational score, which is less 
time-dependent, partly corrects the bias, some newer DG’s may have artificially 
low values.
The main reason why procedural control becomes powerful in the 
presence of controls is that prior career and federalism crowd out the influence 
of procedural discretion for certain officials. Commission officials with a 
background that predisposes them to intergovemmentalism are not influenced 
by whether they work in a Commission-led or Council-dominated policy area. 
For officials with state experience, the association between supranationalism and 
their DG’s power is non-existent (r=.05, p=.720). However, it is very strong for 
individuals without national state experience (r=.46, p=.002): the more 
autonomous the DG, the more likely they are supranationalist. Federalism 




























































































countries lean towards intergovernmentalism and are likely to stick to their 
views (r=.05, p=.679). But officials from federal countries are responsive to the 
opportunities in their DG: r=.52 (p=.013).
A student of the Commission in the early 1970s likened the institution to a 
collection of feudal fiefdoms (Coombes 1970). Recent studies argue that 
functional divisions have hardened in the Commission (Peterson 1997; 
Richardson 1996). In this context, one would expect top officials to be more 
influenced by the limited world of their DG than by the Commission as a whole. 
Yet, the findings of this study indicate that Myles’ simple theorem “you stand 
where you sit” is a complicated matter in the Commission. First of all, 
functional divisions and turf battles do not impede top officials from taking 
position on the big question of European integration: what form should the 
European Union take? Senior officials look beyond the policy garden they 
attend to. Secondly, officials harbor different views on EU governance 
depending on where they work in the Commission: Commission strongholds 
espouse bolder supranationalist views than Commission services that are more 
transparent agents of national governments. Finally, fiefdoms, functional 
divisions, or in more precise terms, the power and reputation of DG’s help shape 
how office holders think about EU governance. However, it makes only a 
difference for officials who consider national sovereignty a priori a somewhat 
artificial concept.
Parachutage
I find no support for the hypothesis that people parachuted into top positions 
from outside the Commission bureaucracy should be more intergovernmentalist 
than those who were recruited among middle-management Commission 
officials. The variable does not come close to significance (Table III), and has 
the wrong sign in most multivariate analyses.
Why do national governments not take advantage of their apparent power 
to appoint Commission officials? Contrary to popular wisdom (including among 
some Commission officials!), the way in which top appointments come about 
makes it unlikely that parachuted officials are more intergovernmentalist than 
their non-parachuted colleagues. All appointments are highly politicized, and all 
are potentially open to member state pressure — through the relevant national 
Commissioner. National quotas for top positions mean that a vacancy is usually 
reserved for one or, at most, a few nationalities. Merit is always bounded by 
nationality. Top appointments are decided among the Commissioner for 
Personnel, the Commissioner of the Directorate-General with a vacancy, and the 
Commissioner(s) of the same nationality as the candidate. The fact that the 




























































































outside the Commission blurs the distinction between parachutage and non- 
parachutage. Finally, cabinet experience is the surest fast track to a top position 
in the Commission. To get promoted, it helps to be noticed by one’s political 
superior, and the best way is by working for the Commissioner. More than one 
third of top officials in the sample served in a Commissioner’s cabinet, that is 
nearly 30 per cent of parachuted top officials, and almost 40 per cent of non- 
parachuted officials. So those few officials who penetrate from middle 
management into the top layer are selected on the basis of the same political 
criteria as their parachuted officials. They have more in common with their 
current parachuted colleagues than with their former collaborators.
Consociational Control
The hypothesis that top Commission officials should reflect the views on EU 
governance of the elite in their country of origin finds support in the simple 
regression (Table III). Officials from countries where the elite is supranationalist 
are much more likely to be supranationalist than their colleagues from countries 
with intergovernmentalist elites. In this respect, Commission officials constitute 
a cross-section of the elite in their country of origin.
There are two plausible interpretations of the strong association between 
the orientations of top officials and national elites. The result is consistent with 
the consociational argument, according to which the Commission is divided in 
factions serving national principals. The consociational reading suggests that 
national elites -  through national governments — purposefully project their 
preferences into European institutions. However, the association may also 
reflect that shared experiences shape the orientations of top Commission 
officials and the elites from their country of origin in the same direction.
There is reason to believe that socialization carries more weight than 
consociationalism. The key lies in why the elite variable, strong in the univariate 
model, becomes insignificant in multivariate models (Models 1-3, and 5). The 
association between elite and Commission official orientations dissolves when 
controlling for federalism. The best strategy for guessing whether an official is 
supranationalist or intergovernmentalist is to find out whether he is from a 
federal, non-unitary or unitary country. For each type of political system, the 
orientations of elites and Commission officials run parallel18. Commission 
officials as well as the elite are more likely to be supranationalist, and to the 
same extent, when they come from a federal than a non-federal country -  with 
the exception of Italians. Knowledge of an official’s nationality hardly increases 
predictive power: the association between the orientations of national elite and 
officials is insignificant within the federal, non-unitary, and unitary groupings. 




























































































For a final test of the relative importance of federalism and elite orientations, 
compare the model with federalism (Model 5) and the one with elite orientations 
(Model 4). The fit is markedly higher in the federalism model than in the elite 
model (adjusted r'=.22 against .19).
country of origin. They do so, not because they have been sent by their national 
governments to defend national interests, but because they share political 
experiences with elites in their home country. One experience stands out: the 
extent to which the political system of their country of origin is sensitive to 
external influences. /
CONCLUSION
The sources of variation in senior Commission officials’ views on European 
integration are to be found in socialization and institutional learning, and less so 
in principal-agent dynamics between the Commission and national governments.
When highfliers take up a senior post in the Commission, they bring with 
them rich experiences, of previous occupations and prior political settings, and 
these are powerful predictors of their views on European integration. Two 
experiences in particular predispose them to intergovernmentalism or 
supranationalism: whether they were ever a state employee; and whether their 
country of origin is unitary or federal, or a large rather than small state. A person 
who once “served his country” as state employee is likely to defend a European 
Union with member states as key pillars -  an intergovernmental Europe. For 
him, national state sovereignty is practical: it stands for effective, efficient, and 
legitimate government. The main task of the European Union, and for him as 
position holder in the Commission, is to facilitate cooperation, help formulating 
common interests and suggest courses of action.
There is another set of experiences that tilt orientations powerfully in the 
direction of intergovernmentalism. Individuals from a political system where 
political authority is vested — not only in principle, but also in practice -  in 
national central institutions, usually do not find much appeal in a supranational 
European Union. They believe that national state institutions are capable of 
effective control over diverse policy areas. The political system that is most 
conducive to these beliefs is that of a large, unitary state. Political actors from 
such states risk losing real policy control to a supranational European Union. 
Actors from small countries and federal systems have far less to lose, and 
probably much to gain. Small countries need rule making at supranational level 
to domesticate otherwise uncertain international relations; federal countries are




























































































used to rule making at multiple levels, and supranational European governance 
extends these rules one level higher. Ultimately, supranationalism is a means for 
actors from small or federal political systems to gain low-cost access to large, 
relatively self-governing pools of resources.
The common denominator has to do with one’s experience of national 
sovereignty. The more an official has encountered practical implications of 
national sovereignty, the more likely he is to embrace intergovernmentalism; the 
more he has found national sovereignty void of real political control, the more 
he is willing to shift authority from national governments to the Commission 
and the European Parliament.
That does not mean that an official’s views are irrevocably fixed by the 
time he arrives in a top position. Working in the Commission may alter his 
views. First of all, the longer he stays in the Commission, the more he is likely 
to become supranationalist. Commission socialization is powerful, though it is 
seldom able to neutralize prior socialization in his country or work environment. 
Secondly, it matters where he works in the Commission. An official in a 
Commission stronghold usually has bolder supranationalist views than a 
manager of a policy area under Council-control. Greater procedural discretion 
makes a top official strive for even greater Commission discretion, which is 
precisely what a principal-agent logic would predict -  the agent continuously on 
the look-out to shirk the principal’s wishes. But there are limits to this logic: it 
works only if the official has a priori a certain distance from the sovereign 
national state. Then, a Matthaeus effect appears: he who is supranationalist, by 
virtue of his prior career or his political experience, becomes even more 
supranationalist -  if he works with strong EU competencies. No such effect for 
intergovernmentalists: a former state employee or national of a large, unitary 
country is likely to remain intergovernmentalist -  whether he sits on powerful 
supranational competencies or not.
While the socialization thesis finds strong support in the data, the results 
are inconclusive for the principal-agent argument. This reflects, in part, 
limitations of operationalization. However, the results enable us to question two 
prevalent arguments. Contrary to common wisdom, there is no evidence that 
parachuted officials are more intergovernmentalist than their non-parachuted 
colleagues. Parachutage, the appointment of candidates from outside the 
services in top positions, is not the instrument through which national 
governments are able to constrain supranational control. Instead, much depends 
on the influence of a national government over the national Commissioner, who 
has a say in all top appointments of his nationality. But there is more: it is 
doubtful that national governments always want to minimize supranational 




























































































elites, and some are supranationalist. Officials tend to reflect their national 
elite’s views, but the data do not allow me to conclude therefore that the latter - 
through national governments - purposefully project their preferences into 
European institutions.
Top Commission officials are embroiled in a fierce struggle among 
political actors for control over EU authoritative resources. One would expect 
them to actively defend the power of the Commission. If not. one would think 
that national governments successfully control them as agents serving national 
interests. However, variation in views among top officials is not easily 
understood in terms of principal-agency. Commission officials are not simply 
supranational activists or intergovernmental agents. Rather, when they enter 
their office in the morning, they bring with them views on European integration 
that have matured as a result of experiences from various institutional contexts.
Liesbet Hooghe
Department of Political Science 
100 St George Street 
University of Toronto M5S 3G3 
Fax 416-278-5566 





























































































'This project would not have been possible without the generous cooperation of 140 senior 
Commission officials. I thank the Catholic University of Brussels, particularly Marc 
Swyngedouw, for providing hospitality during two summers of interviewing, and the Robert 
Schuman Centre (EUI, Florence), for giving me the opportunity to work on the project as Jean 
Monnet Fellow (1996-97). Special thanks to Jim Caporaso, Gary Marks, Neil Nevitte and four 
anonymous referees for comments. This paper is part of a larger project financially supported 
by the Department of Political Science (University of Toronto), and the Canadian Social 
Science and Humanities Research Council (grant SSHRC Research No. 72005976, Fund 
No.410185).
2Until the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, the official name was “European Community”, but I use 
the current label “European Union” throughout.
3Data from the mail questionnaires (n=106).
4The reader will note that I use masculine pronouns. Using the she-form would create a false 
impression of gender balance. Of the 140 interviewed officials, only nine are women, and six 
of them gained A1-A2 level status after 1995.
Principal components factor analysis identifies a single dimension, with Eigenvalue of 1.48 
and 49.4 per cent of variance explained. The factor loadings are -.74 for member states, .71 
for the Commission, and .66 for the Parliament. So supranationalism draws equally strongly 
from the three items, which is why the correlation between the factor and the index is .99. 
These results support my contention that the items tap into complementary, but distinct 
aspects of political authority relations. A straightforward additive index conveys this 
conceptual message more powerfully than a factor. (Cronbach’s alpha for this index is .49). 
6On a scale of 1 to 10, the mean is 5.45 and the median is 5; the neutral value would be 5.5. 
The distribution is skewed to intergovemmentalism (skewness= .217), and flatter than a 
normal distribution (kurtosis=-.367). Almost 6% are radical intergovemmentalists, 27% 
moderate intergovemmentalists, against 8.5% radical and 22.5% moderate supranationalists; 
the remaining 36% balances both principles. (Calculated by dividing the index in five 
categories.)
7The category “national state sector” consists of positions in the executive branch of the state 
and hierarchically subordinate to the national government: civil servants in line ministries, 
diplomats (excluding EU postings), and government ministers. For public servants in 
positions of autonomy vis-à-vis the national government (courts, central bank, parliament, 
public companies, corporatist structures, local and regional government), I allocate 50% to 
state and 50% to non-state. The core of the “state in EU” category consists of postings in 
Brussels or Strasbourg serving national interests near or in European institutions: Permanent 
Representation, accession negotiations, embassies with EU institutions, Council secretariat. 
Some postings in the national capitals have a strong European component, mainly in the 
ministry for foreign affairs or coordination positions near the head of government: I allocate 
half of the years to the state and half to the state in EU.
8 The index is an update of the Regional Autonomy index developed by Gary Marks et al. 
(1996). The first component, federalism, refers to the constitutional scope for regional 




























































































state (value=4). A second measure takes into account special arrangements for home rule (0- 
2). Finally, the role of regions in central government is evaluated (0-2). This produces in 
descending order: 7 (Belgium), 6 (Germany), 5 (Austria, Spain), 2 (Denmark, France, Italy, 
Portugal), 1 (United Kingdom), 0 (Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Sweden).
’Regulatory Commission output is measured in relative (% of total output: a value of 1 if 
below 30%, 2 for 30-59%, 3 for 60 % or more) and absolute terms (a value of 0 if fewer than 
500 pieces, and 1 if 500 pieces or more). Autonomy in adjudication is based on the absolute 
number of Court cases initiated by a DG, with a value of 0 when no cases, 1 if fewer than 50 
cases, and 2 if 50 or more cases. I add the values on these three indicators.
l0DGs with a high reputation (mentioned by 50 % or more) obtain a value of 2, those with 
medium reputation (mentioned by 5-49 %) 1, and the remainder 0.
"The three questions are: EP support for Commission — “The President and Members of the 
European Commission should have the support of a majority in the European Parliament or 
they should resign”; Equal rights for EP — “In matters of EU legislation, taxation and 
expenditure, the European Parliament should have equal rights with the Council of Ministers, 
which represents the national governments”; European government — “The European Union 
should have a European government responsible to the European Parliament”. 
(Eurobarometer, 1996, p.9.)
12 The z-scores are in descending order: 1.74 (Belgium), 1.25 (Italy), .95 (Greece), .71 
(Germany), .52 (Spain), .34 (Netherlands), .08 (Austria, France), -.17 (Luxembourg), -.34 
(UK), -.52 (Ireland), -.71 (Portugal), -.95 (Sweden), -1.25 (Finland), -1.74 (Denmark). 
Detailed data are available from the author: lhooghe@chass.utoronto.ca.
13Regressing each variable against all other dependent variables confirms collinearity. The 
overall fit improves slightly if one excludes ‘parachutage’, which has no explanatory powers 
but aggravates problems of collinearity.
14 The statistically non-significant association between supranationalism and state service in 
EU affairs does not support the “going native” argument, which states that people who work 
in and around EU institutions become more sensitive to EU values and norms (Beyers and 
Dierickx 1997; Christoph 1993; Cram 1997; Schneider 1997). Instead, people at the interface 
of the European Union and national states prefer to keep intergovernmental and supranational 
authority in balance.
15 In addition, enlargement distorts the Commission socialization hypothesis indirectly. Two- 
thirds of top officials in the sample are still the “a-typical” recruits of the initial enlargement 
appointments. For example, of the 18 UK officials, 12 were appointed in the special 
recruitment wave after UK entry, and only three over the last ten years. So variation on the 
independent variable is limited. Controlling for nationality-specific variables creates many 
empty cells, which weakens measurements of association (Western 1995; Shalev 1997). This 
may induce one to underestimate Commission socialization. A test for the original six 
member states, where all top officials were recruited under normal procedures, shows that 
Commission socialization becomes a much stronger predictor (adj r'=  .12, beta=.34, t=2.756) 
than prior career (adj r'=.06, beta=-.28, t=-2.179).




























































































Over time, intergovemmentalist officials may leave the Commission more readily than 
supranationalists. However, though the older generation as a group is more supranational than 
recent recruits, it is also more deeply divided. The standard deviations are greater for older 
cohorts (31-35 years service, s=2.21; 26-30 years, s=2.07) than for recent recruits (0-5 years. 
s= 1.74; 6-10 years, s=1.69) and than the sample average (s= 1.98).
17 Officials from federal countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain) lean to 
supranationalism with on average +1.36 above the neutral score; non-unitary systems 
(Denmark, France, Portugal) without Italy, are inclined to intergovemmentalism with -0.83, 
and including Italy, -0.30; unitary systems bend to intergovemmentalism with -0.56.
18 Z-distributions help identify the relative location of an observed value in a data distribution. 
For elite and officials’ orientations, 1 calculate average z-scores in federal, non-unitary 
(excluding Italy) and unitary country groups. The scores are strikingly similar: in federal 
countries, .871 for elites and .667 for officials; in non-unitary countries, -.403 for elites and - 
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